Editor's Note: At a seminar sponsored by China Daily last week, leading researchers on Taiwan studies analysed the current cross-Straits situation and gave their opinion on the future development of bilateral ties. The following is the first part of some of their thoughts.

　　Between Taiwan's 2000 "presidential" elections when the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian came to power and the "legislative" elections last December, many people as well as the international media started to talk about Taiwan's "nationalism" or "national identity," as if "Taiwan independence" had become the island's mainstream public opinion.

　　However, most opinion polls in Taiwan continue to show that over 70 per cent of Taiwanese people are still in favour of the status quo across the Taiwan Straits.

　　How powerful are the secessionist forces in Taiwan? This is a crucial question which has to be addressed correctly before one can try to predict Taiwan's political future.

　　A detailed study of the opinion polls concerning the "independence vs reunification" issue over the past 10 years as well as the results of six major elections (the "presidential" elections in 2000 and 2004; the "legislative" elections in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004) has led me to conclude the following. First, the fundamentalists who want "Taiwan independence" make up about 20 per cent of the island's total population.

　　I believe there are five criteria to be a fundamentalist: Taiwan should seek independence even at the risk of war; Taiwan could win a war of independence; Taiwan should never establish the three direct links - trade, transport and postal services - with the mainland because they would be harmful to the island; Taiwan can develop its economy without the mainland; and Taiwan should maintain good relations with the United States only while its relations with the mainland is of secondary importance.

　　My study of all these opinion polls show that, on average, 20 per cent of the Taiwanese people hold such views.

　　Second, the core supporters of both the pan-green camp (a pro-independence alliance between the ruling DPP and hardline Taiwan Solidarity Union) and the pan-blue camp (an alliance between the opposition Kuomintang, People First Party and New Party) respectively make up about 35 per cent of the voters.

　　If the so-called "light blue" and "light green" voters are added to each camp, there would still be a parity of 45 per cent vs 45 per cent. So in future elections, any camp that could win 6 per cent of the swinging voters would win the election.

　　Third, according to the opinion polls, supporters of the pan-green camp are mostly people above 50 years old who have an elementary education while the supporters of the pan-blue camp are usually younger and enjoy a higher level of education.

　　People who engage in agricultural and fishing industries usually support the pan-green camp while civil servants and white-collar or blue-collar workers in the high-tech industries support the pan-blue camp.

　　For instance, the pan-blue camp enjoys overwhelming support in the high-tech industrial areas of Hsinchu County.

　　Seen from the age and stratum structure, the supporters of the pan-green camp hardly represent the future of Taiwan.

　　From the above findings, I cannot conclude that the pan-green camp has the upper hand in its political fight against the pan-blue camp. The majority of the Taiwanese people are still in favour of maintaining the cross-Straits status quo.

　　If the pan-green camp overuse the ethnic and "Taiwan independence" cards, they may shoot themselves in the foot.

　　The last "legislative" elections, when the pan-green camp was defeated by the pan-blue camp, is a case in point.

　　(Source: China Daily)