How far is ROK from "self-defense"?

Source
China Military Online
Editor
Huang Panyue
Time
2019-01-25 17:12:24

ROK Military budgets in the next five years (The information shown above as follows):

Defense spending of the ROK in 2019–2023 will reach KRW 270.7 trillion

Annual military expenses:

KRW 46.7 trillion in 2019;

KRW 50.3 trillion in 2020;

KRW 54.1 trillion in 2021;

KRW 57.8 trillion in 2022;

KRW 61.8 trillion in 2023

Funds appropriated:

KRW 94.1 trillion, the proportion will increase from 32.9% in 2019 to 36.5% in 2023;

the proportion of domestically-made equipment in the procurement will increase from 72% in 2019 to 80% in 2023;

Expenditures on high-tech weapon systems and related technology research and development:

KRW 21.9 trillion

Adjustment of national defense manpower structure:

The ROK military will cut back is standing troops from 599,000 to 500,000.

Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) issued the Mid-Term Defense Program for 2019-2023 on January 11th, 2019. According to recent changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Mid-Term Defense Program set up an overall plan for the ROK’s national defense in the next five years, and includes specific policies to support its "Defense Reform 2.0".

The defense spending plan is undoubtedly of positive significance to strengthen the ROK’s own military strength and accelerate its process of achieving "self-defense". However, its results remain to be seen due to the constraints of multiple factors.

Intending to regain wartime operational command

The Mid-term Defense Program is part of the ROK's efforts to promote national defense reform, and embodies the spirit of "Defense Reform 2.0", that is, strengthening military strength of the ROK and accelerating the realization of "self-defense".

As Ministry of National Defense of the ROK has said, the release of the Mid-term Defense Program is based on the firm will of the Moon Jae-in government to reform, and aims to build a strong army as soon as possible, so as to provide powerful support for national peace and prosperity.

The ROK is the only country in the world that has handed over wartime operational command to another country. The US military controls the ROK’s wartime operational command, and the transfer of it has been postponed several times, which is mainly out of considerations for the ROK’s security.

Nowadays, with the easing of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the strong promotion of the Moon Jae-in government, the ROK has accelerated the pace of retrieving its wartime operational command. And surely the improvement of its own military strength is a pre-requisite for the command transfer.

In other words, the ROK needs to actively promote its "Defense Reform 2.0", and build a smaller-sized but more efficient armed force with more sustained and adequate defense investment, with a view to accelerate the realization of the "self-defense" that the ROK is striving for.

The Mid-term Defense Program is the phased achievement in advancing the "Defense Reform 2.0." In the next five years, the ROK will not only significantly increase its defense spending, but will also vigorously upgrade the level of its domestic weapons and equipment procurement and enhance the competitiveness of its own military industry.

Meanwhile, the ROK has continued to improve its ability to rush to attack before war, to intercept during war, and to retaliate after war, attempting to reduce its dependence on the United States, including the nuclear protection, extended deterrence, and early warning systems for various missiles provided by the United States.

Obviously, this has gone beyond the ROK’s simple purpose to respond to military threats. All in all, the fundamental goal of the Mid-term Defense Program is to continuously enhance its ability of "self-defense", so as to get the ROK prepared for regain of wartime operational command during the presidency of Moon Jae-in.

In addition, the recovery of wartime operational command and speeding up the realization of "self-defense" are based on a broad public opinion foundation in the ROK.

The current president Moon Jae-in has promised during his election campaign that if elected, he would retrieve wartime operational command during his term of office. Failure to respond to the concerns of voters will definitely affect the grassroots support for Moon Jae-in.

Therefore, when he took office, he submitted a report to the National Planning Advisory Committee, and subsequently set up a Special Committee for National Defense Reform to discuss specific schemes for retrieving wartime operational command.

Too much reliance on the US is a constraint

It is undeniable that the Mid-term Defense Program of the ROK is conducive to enhancing its military strength under the support of sufficient defense budget. However, the mid-term program gets intertwined with the transfer of wartime operational command and the sharing of expenditure of United States Forces Korea (USFK). Both factors will exert influence on the ROK-US military alliance and become an important variable affecting the fulfillment of the Mid-term Defense Program.

Although the Mid-term Defense Program has increased investment in the construction of "self-defense", the ROK military has yet to establish an independent command system. Its intelligence acquisition relies almost entirely on the US military. Among others, the strategic intelligence accounts for 95%, and the tactical intelligence 70% to 80%. Besides, all kinds of weapons and equipment in the ROK are also provided by the United States. Although the ROK can produce some fighters and warships on its own, its core technologies and components are still derived from the United States.

Even if the ROK military regained its wartime operational command, it would merely be a formality, and it is very likely that the ROK would hand over the power to the US military again in the face of sudden large-scale military conflicts.

At present, the United States and the ROK have reached a deadlock on the expenditure sharing of the USFK, bringing many uncertainties to the transfer of wartime operational command from the US to the ROK.

From March to December, 2018, the two countries conducted 10 rounds of long and arduous negotiations on the 10th US-ROK Special Agreements on the Expenditure Sharing of the USFK. Due to the differences in the "overall scale" of the above mentioned agreements, the two parties ultimately failed to reach an agreement.

The breakdown of the negotiations is likely to put the ROK in "lockout" in 2019. This will in turn have a certain impact on the ROK-US military alliance and the power pattern of Northeast Asia. Even worse, it may seriously restrict the ROK to realize "self-defense".

It should be pointed out that the autonomy of a country's national defense can't be achieved by simply increasing defense spending. If the ROK wants to take back wartime operational command and realize "self-defense" as soon as possible, it will also need to determine the status and scale of the USFK.

However, these definitely can't be solved by a five-year Mid-term Defense Program. Whether the ROK military can successfully realize its "self-defense" remains to be observed.

Disclaimer: The author is Mu Xiaoming, reporter with the www.CRNTT.com. The article is translated from Chinese into English by the China Military Online. The information, ideas or opinions appearing in this article are those of the author from the www.CRNTT.com and do not reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn. Chinamil.com.cn does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same. If the article carries photographs or images, we do not vouch for their authenticity.

 

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